Essay Instructions: Sir,
This is a agrumentive essay on the Kosovo War, based on the Book WInning Ugly: NATO War to save Kosovo.
I need to strenghten several points and add more analysis and use less histroy in this argumentive essay.
So if you could please look at what I have in the Essay below and rework it for me.
Key areas that need improvement
1) What is the Focus of the paper. (That this was a just war)
2) What is my thesis or position (What I whated to say is that NATO and the US acted correctly in their action in KOSOVO)
3) How will I prove my point
4) Then in each of the three areas (strategy formulation, coordination, and execution), I listed I need to show my proff; methodology at work
5) Use less history and more analysis, history to support position, in each of the three areas.
6) Balnace out strategy formulation, coordination, and execution, so they each have a balanced portion of the paper.
7) Restate my conclusions so that it re-answers the question that was examined. (Support my position and summerize my three categories strategy formulation, coordination, and execution)
The paper
The Strategy executed by the United States (U.S.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was effective in the handling of the Kosovo crisis. Both the U.S. and NATO did not fight this war in order to overthrow the Yugoslavian government nor to give the Kosovo Albanian a country of their own. This war was fought to stop the needless ethnic violence against the Albanians living in Kosovo and allow the return of all refugees, and that is just what both the U.S. and NATO did during this military operation. The U.S. and NATO had no intention of any major military operation, they only wished to use the minium force required in order to achieve their stated goals.
This paper examines the strategy formulation, coordination, and execution, that lead to NATO?s war to save Kosovo. How the U.S. and NATO reached their goal could not be described as perfectly executed, or even well thought out. In the end, when the dust settled, ?the alliance was able to reverse most of the damage? (W.U., p. 4) that Serbia had caused during the early stages of the war. In fact, practically every one of the 1.3 million ethnic Albanians who were pushed out of their own homes and land returned to their communities a few weeks after the war was concluded. So both the U.S. and NATO were justified in their reason for taking military action.
Strategy Formulation
In 1989, Milosevic ?stripped Kosovo of its autonomy? (W.U. p. 8) in an effort to take away any political or geographical power that Kosovo had enjoyed as part of the Yugoslav Federation. In the same year, in response to Milosevic?s actions, the Albanians established parallel state structures to officially go head-to-head with the Serb power grab, an idea of pacifist leader Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK).
The American administrations of both George Bush Senior and Bill Clinton vowed that the United States would become militarily involved in Kosovo if Milosevic actually carried out a ?violent crackdown? (W.U., p. 9) against the ethnic Albanians. In 1992, Bush noted, ??in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.? In 1993, Clinton?s administration re-stated a similar threat, noting that the concern of the U.S. and Western allies was not self-determination for Kosovo, but the protection of human rights of ethnic Albanians.
The U.S. and NATO allies were not willing to witness a massacre on any great level. However, a massacre occurred in March of 1998 as Milosevic?s Serb military troops slaughtered 85 ethnic Albanians in a brutally indiscriminate attempt to limit the Kosovo Liberation Army?s (KLA) growing power in Kosovo. In response to this continued violent action by Serbian forces, the U.S. and its NATO allies began preparations for the defense of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
On 12 June 1998, the North Atlantic Council began looking at action that might have to be taken in order to stabilize the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. With events in Kosovo getting worse, on 13 Oct 1998 NATO authorized activation orders for air strikes. This move was designed to support diplomatic efforts to make the Milosevic government withdraw forces from Kosovo, cooperate in bringing an end to the violence and facilitate the return of Albanian refuges to their homes. At the last moment, following further diplomatic initiatives including visits to the Yugoslavian capital by both NATO and U.S. diplomatic envoys President Milosevic agreed to comply and the air strikes were called off.
The UN passed Resolution 1199 which expressed deep concerns about the excessive use of force by the Yugoslavian military and police forces, and called for a cease-fire by all parties involved in the hostilities. This resolution helped bring about negotiations that called for a limit on the number of Yugoslavian military and police forces in Kosovo, and limiting their action in the region.
It was also agreed through negotiations that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would maintain an unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to observe compliance as to the use of force and placement of both military and policy forces in Kosovo. Both NATO and the U.S. then went to the UN Security Council to have resolution 1203 passed. This gave UN backing for the placement of the OSCE mission in Kosovo. NATO and the U.S. recruited several non-NATO countries to contribute forces in order to ensure unbiased verification. NATO then established a special military task force to evacuate this mission if renewed conflicts would endanger the safety of the force.
A Contact Group was formed consisting of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and the U.S. This group met initially to talk about what could be done to stabilize Kosovo and develop a unified strategy. The Contact group issued four demands. 1) cessation of all fighting between both sides, 2) Withdrawal of all Serbian special forces, 3) return of refugees, 4) and unlimited access for international monitors. Serbia agreed to all but the final demand concerning the placement of international monitors. Yet again after agreeing to stop offensive actions against the ethnic Albanian, Serbian military forces continued to drive thousands from Kosovo, and NATO was forced to watch from the sidelines. However, on June 11, 1998, NATO ordered NATO planes to put on a power show over Kosovo. On the 15th of June more than 80 warplanes from 13 NATO nations put on a show of power, ?to demonstrate NATO?s capability to project power into the region? (W.U., p. 32).
Strategy Coordination
One reason the strategy was flawed was that Milosevic already had a history of mass murder, and the NATO leadership and the U.S. was fully aware that in Bosnia Milosevic had killed at least 100,000 people, who were mostly Muslims and Croats. Those killings had occurred ten years prior to the slaughter of 85 ethnic Albanians in 1998. Serbia campaign against the ethnic Albanians should have been clear and obvious to the U.S. and its allies.
As mentioned earlier, NATO surely did the right thing by intervening in Kosovo and stopping the ethnic cleansing of Albanians, but NATO?s decision on how to protect the ethnic population from further aggression was not thought out or planned. President Clinton?s approach in May 1999 about six weeks into the NATO-led attacks against Serbia was speak loudly, but carry a small stick. This was due to the current political situation in the U.S. President Clinton, who had his own political troubles due to the Monica Lewinski scandal, did not want to try to talk the U.S. Congress into sending a huge contingent of ground forces into Kosovo. In addition, policymakers in Washington and in other Western nations were apparently unwilling to set political objectives in terms of how far the allies would go to protect ethnic Albanians.
As Milosevic continued his repressive policies toward ethnic Albanians, NATO considered a series of options, including putting political pressure on Milosevic, military action that included ground forces, and strictly air power actions. In August, after Milosevic?s forces pushed 100,000 Kosovars from their homes, the UN finally passed a resolution demanding Milosevic cease his actions against civilians. This resolution gave NATO grounds to begin the process of how to take action, though no mandate for the use of force was immediately forthcoming (W.U., p. 43).
On January 15, 1999, Milosevic?s armies slaughtered 45 people in the village of Racak in southern Kosovo. This act by Milosevic ?proved to be a turning point for the U.S.? and the allies in NATO: ?it was now that a new policy was needed, one that stressed decisive action? (W.U., p. 64). This was no time for wait-and-see, but instead of using the military force that had been threatened, NATO made another attempt to find a peaceful solution by sending military leaders to Belgrade.
This was done by NATO and the U.S. throwing their weight behind the Contact groups? efforts at restarting talks between the two sides. These negotiations were conducted in Rambouillet and Paris, France during the month of February. At the end of negotiations the Kosovo delegation agreed to sign the proposed peace settlement, but the Yugoslavian government walked out without signing.
The U.S. and NATO withdrew the OSCE verification mission on the 20 of March, which was facing a buildup of resistance from the Yugoslavian forces in the region, limiting if not completely blocking their ability to function as a verification mission. The U.S. government despatched Ambassador Holbrooke in a last minute attempt to dissuade President Milosevic from continuing his governments current actions or face immediate military action.
Strategy Execution
The military campaign was launched on March 24, 1999, with the decision to only use air power to stem the violence in Kosovo. This decision was based on the fallacy that Serbia would stop all military operations in Kosovo, and accept the NATO peace plan after just a few bombs had been dropped. At a news conference Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated ?I think that this is achievable in a short period of time? (W.U., 91). Albright?s comment was based on the belief that Serbia would see how difficult it was to stand up to the military power of NATO. NATO started this phase of the air campaign with limited combat aircraft, and just a couple of days? worth of preselected targets. Yet another sign that NATO and the U.S. were ill-prepared for any long term operations can be seen by the decision not to move an aircraft carrier into the region. Additionally, combat aircraft where restricted from flying below 15,000 due to the air threat.
Serbia did not succumb to NATO, but instead escalated the violence against Kosovo, by operating in small units, that were not hampered by the bombing. NATO?s poor judgment in the strategic planning of this campaign led to flying in all reinforcements, as no plan had been established for the propositioning of war supplies. A larger problem of NATO strategy was that Operation Allied Force began the campaign with just 350 aircraft and failed to even have an aircraft carrier in range of Kosovo. This force would later triple in size in order to win the war. The response was also hampered by the strategy of limited escalations in the use of air power against targets in Kosovo and Serbia.
Yet another blunder on the part of NATO was that allied officials were worried ?about causing too much? (W. U, 2000) damage to Serbia, rather than creating too little damage. Klaus Naumann, a German General involved in the NATO actions hit the nail on the head when he noted that Milosevic had ?accepted war? while the allies had only accepted the idea of ?an operation? (W. U., p. 105). These examples showed the strategy that NATO had going into this campaign were not designed too win the war.
Indeed, ?NATO could have lost this war? (W.U., p. 106), but for the help of Milosevic, who set out to push all Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo during the early stages of the bombing campaign. Milosevic?s actions succeeded in outraging all of the members of NATO, and led to an increased effort against military targets in Kosovo and Serbia. As of March 27, NATO entered Phase 2 of the war, which authorized a wider set of Serbian targets. The ultimate winning of the war was assisted by the fact that NATO had decided ?they could not afford to lose this war? with a ?35-to-1 superiority in military manpower? and a ?300-to-1 superiority in defense spending? (W.U., p. 140). To lose a war because of a lack of willingness on the part of the allied and NATO players would be a disaster so great that Europe and American could never live it down.
Conclusion
The Strategy that was executed by the U.S. and NATO was effective. Their only intent was to bring peace to Kosovo by stopping the forced departure of the Albanian population, not to overthrow a nation. When the Yugoslavian government decide to stand its ground against the initial military action, the U.S. and NATO were forced to expand the bombing campaign in order to increase pressure on the Yugoslavian government that would bring them to the negotiation table. The U.S. and NATO achieved their stated goal of returning the ethnic Albanian population to their homes, and the withdrawal of Yugoslavian military forces from Kosovo.
